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I. INTRODUCTION
In the autumn of 1988, all of Canada was abuzz. Parliamentary
elections were to take place on November 21-elections that would be
governed by practically one issue alone: the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (FTA). Prime Minister Brian Mulroney had spent two years
negotiating the agreement, both sides had signed it, and there remained only
ratification by the Canadian Parliament. Under the agreement, Parliament
was required to ratify it by January 1, 1989.
The question of whether free trade with the United States was good
for Canada-a question that had as much to do with nationalism as with
economic well-being-electrified the voters. The Toronto Star bitterly
campaigned against free trade via news columns and editorial pages, warning
of the threat to Canada's economic independence. On television, two FTA-
dominated debates prompted angry exchanges between Mulroney and
opponents, New Democratic leader Ed Broadbent and Liberal Party leader
John Turner. Broadbent trumpeted: "I don't want to see the same social
services here as in the U.S."' Retorted Mulroney: "You are trying to
frighten the elderly."' Turner responded less hysterically, proclaiming that
"[t]he salesman.., has a very weak product."3 Both Broadbent and Turner
vowed to tear up the deal if elected.'
Opposition stemmed from the understanding that the FTA would do
nothing to squelch the United States' frustratingly tireless imposition of
countervailing duties against Canadian products, particularly products
enjoying government grants under Canadian regional development programs
that were deemed "subsidized" under U.S. law.5 Regional development
programs are programs initiated by a government to assist a particular
economically depressed geographic region.6 Countervailing duties are special
fees imposed on importers of a product; the amount of the duty, in theory,
exactly matches some unfair advantage that the product enjoys in the U.S.
market.
'Mulroney Pledges in Debate to Cancel FTA if it Harms Development Effort,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) (Oct. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Mulroney Pledges].
2 Id.
3 1d.
4 Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 14, 1988, at 22.
5 Canadian Trade Policy: The Anatomy of a Trade Deal, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
22, 1988, at 77.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 76-81.
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Canada's regional development programs were designed to help
specific areas of Canada. The programs included tax incentives, low-interest
loans, and development grants. Unfortunately for the recipients, current
customs duty rules (discussed in detail below) allow the U.S. Department of
Commerce to levy a countervailing duty whenever an import seems to have
received assistance in production. The amount of the subsidy correspondingly
reduces the price at which the product is offered, and a duty equal in price
to the subsidy "levels the playing field"-as trade officials are often quoted.7
The FTA did not address countervailing duties levied on products
subsidized under a regional development program. This was precisely the
problem. Many Canadians could not conceive of an agreement that would be
good for Canada unless the agreement specifically eliminated the U.S.
practice?
Lately, the U.S. has found more and more Canadian regional
development programs to be subsidies. However, these programs had not
been put in place to give a competitive advantage to exports. Although Prime
Minister Mulroney was emphatic that "under no condition would we agree
to limit our ability to subsidize regional development," 9 some worried about
future U.S. targets. Would universal health care and other insurance
programs be seen as countervailable subsidies on Canadian products? Moaned
I The Ups, Downs and Ups Again of Brian Mulroney, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 27, at 863 (July 5, 1989).
1 For those of you in suspense about the outcome of the Canadian elections,
Mr. Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives won the election on November
21st with 170 seats, against 82 for the Liberals and 43 for the New
Democrats.... mhe Tories' contingent is smaller than the 211 members
they had in the last House of Commons, and the party won only 43% of
the popular vote. But everybody agrees that the prime minister can now
legitimately push enabling legislation for the free-trade deal through
parliament by the agreed deadline on January 1st.
Tim ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1988, at 43.
Further, the United States and Canada hammered out agreements to govern
trade disputes. The agreement now allows parties to dismiss their court cases and have
their disputes settled by a panel of lawyers, whose decision would be final. The panel
applies the same rules as would a court, although it is quicker, less expensive, and
politically more discreet. The panels appear to give less deference to the U.S.
International Trade Commission than the courts. Fin. Times, Oct. 10, 1990, § 1 at 4.
Still, since use of the panel is only available in cases involving Canada-and
even then is not required-a discussion of judicial application of U.S. law to regional
development programs is still appropriate.
' Mulroney Pledges, supra note 1.
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Tony Halliday, Director General of Canada's Free Trade Management
Office: "There is a perception Americans have that they [Americans] operate
purely according to market principles and that in Canada everything that
moves is subsidized." 10
The issue of countervailing regional development programs brings
together two opposing ideals.
On one hand is the desire to redistribute income toward socially
deserving groups. On the other hand, the growing degree of
openness and interdependence among trading nations requires trade
to be as fair and free as possible. When governments try to help
their poorer regions, they collide with principles of laissez-faire
economic policies."
This paper explores the extent to which U.S. law affects regional
development programs in other countries. First, it introduces the concept of
countervailing duties and the procedures for implementing them. Next, it
looks substantively at the law of countervailing duties. The paper traces the
legal development over the last eighty years to determine how the law has
been applied, the types of subsidies that have been successfully countervailed,
and the limitations of the law. Then, the paper looks specifically at regional
development programs: what are they; why they are in place; and what
aspects match the criteria for countervailability. Finally, the paper looks at
public policy aspects and questions the appropriateness of applying
countervailing duty laws to regional development programs.
II. U.S. LAW OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
A. Procedure and Standard of Review
Because administrative procedures for implementing countervailing
duties are always the same, even for those cases having nothing to do with
regional development programs, I discuss them first. The actual laws that
allow the imposition of countervailing duties are discussed second.
The imposition of a countervailing duty begins when a manufacturer,
producer, or wholesaler files a petition to the U.S. Department of
10 Countervailing Duties: Too Early in FTA Subsidy Talks for Canada to Take
Position, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1471 (Nov. 15, 1989).
1 R. BALDWIN, THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: TOWARD GREATER
LmERALrZATION (1979), reprinted in R. BALDWIN, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 231 (1981).
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Commerce, the administering authority for U.S. trade laws. 2 A petition
also may be filed with the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) for
cases involving countries that have signed the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) Subsidies Code13 or have a similar understanding with
the United States. Labor unions and trade or business associations also can
file a petition if they represent manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers.14
The Department of Commerce itself may initiate actions without a
petition.1 5
If the Department of Commerce or the ITC deem the petition to have
merit, the process continues. The International Trade Administration (ITA),
a division of the Department of Commerce, investigates the existence of a
countervailable subsidy and, if found, its amount. The ITA investigates
petitions through hearings and, when possible, on-site verifications. Always,
the ITA sends direct questionnaires to the foreign governments and industries
named in the petition, asking them to provide information about the
subsidy. 6 Information returned on the questionnaire can demonstrate that
no financial or other subsidy exists. Alternatively, the information could
explain away the subsidy by showing it to be fair or to fall within some
exception, or it could provide more concrete evidence of the subsidy amount.
Failure to supply economic and other data to ITA investigators is usually, as
a practical matter, detrimental to the foreign exporter. The Department of
12 In 19 U.S.C. § 1303, an important law relating to countervailing duties
(discussed in greater detail below), the administering authority was the Secretary of
the Treasury. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b) (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1988).
Subsequently, all functions of the Secretary of the Treasury, the General Counsel of
the Treasury, or the Department of the Treasury were transferred to the Secretary of
Commerce. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 5 reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2171
app. at 147-54. The Treasury Department still assesses and collects duties as directed
by the Secretary of Commerce. See also Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 673 F. Supp.
454, 463 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) ("The Secretary of Commerce has been entrusted with
the authority and responsibility for administering the countervailing duty law.").
1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral treaty
accepted by 23 countries in 1947. It addresses customs and commercial policy,
focusing primarily on tariffs and other trade barriers. In addition to those parties who
have both signed and ratified the treaty, 85 countries have signed the treaty. 5 THE
NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNIcA 174 (15th ed. 1986).
14 Otterness, McFaul & Cutshaw, The ABCs of American Trade Laws on Foreign
Dumping and Subsidies; U.S. Trade Laws, 9 Bus. AM. 4 (Dec. 8, 1986); Id. See,
e.g., Roses, Inc. v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 870 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990) (petition
was filed by the California Floral Trade Council).
11 Otterness, McFaul & Cutshaw, supra note 14.
16 Id.
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Commerce is authorized to use "the best information otherwise available"
and will also use other, less accurate and less complete sources. 7 The
Department, however, remains compelled to "verify all information relied
upon in making a final determination in an investigation." 8 Furthermore,
the Department must report "the methods and procedures used to verify such
-information." 19
The Court of International Trade (CIT), a federal district court sitting
in Washington, D.C., hears appeals from Department of Commerce decisions
to impose (or to decline to impose) a countervailing duty. Within thirty days
after notice of the Department's decision, an interested party may challenge
an action by filing suit.' The CIT must uphold the Department's findings
unless it determines that the ruling is "unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."21
The court gives much deference to Department of Commerce
findings. ' "Substantial" evidence, here, is "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. '" "In
enacting the 1979 Trade Agreements Act," stated CIT Judge Musgrave,
"Congress evidenced an intent to grant greater flexibility to the administering
agencies so as to make less difficult and less lengthy the application and
enforcement of the laws in these areas."'
B. The Substantive Law
Two sections of the United States Code, sections 1303 and 1671,
allow the "administering authority"' to impose countervailing duties. Both
sections fall under Title 19, Customs Duties. One section was part of the
Trade Act of 1930 and now appears as section 1303. It states that whenever
any country pays directly or indirectly, "bounty or grant" upon the
1' 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1988).
's 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(1) (1988).
19 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1988).
20 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
2119 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1988).
22 Armeo Inc. v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 1514, 1518 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990);
Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 454, 463 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
Hercules, 673 F. Supp. at 463 (citing Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United
States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
24 Armco, 733 F. Supp. at 1518.
1 That is, the Department of Commerce. See supra note 12.
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manufacture, production, or export of any merchandise, upon the article's
importation into the United States, "there shall be levied and paid, in all such
cases, in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net
amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed. " '
Section 1303 excepts "any article or merchandise which is the
product of a country under the Agreement." A country "under the
Agreement" is a country that, with the United States, is a party to the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as determined under
section 2(b) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.27
Countries "under the Agreement" fall within the other applicable
statute, section 1671. It contains provisions very similar to section 1303.
Section 1671 states that if the administering authority determines that a
country or private person is providing, directly or indirectly, a "subsidy"
with respect to the manufacture of any article that is imported into the United
States, then "there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing
duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net
subsidy. "I
26 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). In full, the section reads:
(a) Levy of countervailing duties. (1) Except in the case of an article or
merchandise which is the product of a country under the Agreement
(within the meaning of section 1671 of this title) whenever any country,
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of
government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation, shall
pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the
manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise
manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province,
or other political subdivision of government, then upon the importation of
such article or merchandise into the United States, whether the same shall
be imported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and
whether such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as
when exported from the country of production or has been changed in
condition by remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in
all such cases, in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal
to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or
bestowed.
27 As determined under § (b)(2)(B)(c)(5) of 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1988). In
summary, this means that the President has determined that the country has met
certain criteria in representing its intentions in trade matters.
28 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1988) (emphasis added). The entire code section reads as
follows:
(a) General Rule. If-
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There are two differences between sections 1671 and 1303. First,
section 1671 refers to "subsidies" while section 1303 refers to "bounties or
grants." This distinction is not important for our purposes because the term
"subsidy" in section 1671 has the same meaning as "bounty or grant" in
section 1303.1' Likewise, "bounty or grant" means the same as "subsidy,"
and any statutory clarification of the term (for purposes of countervailing
duties) is also meant to apply to section 1303.' Courts use the terms
interchangeably. The second difference is that section 1671 requires a
"material injury" or a threat of one. Although section 1303 does not require
such a showing, it follows that without any injury, the Department of
Commerce would not find sufficient grounds for continuing the investigation.
(1) the administering authority determines that-
(A) a country under the Agreement, or
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a
country, or a corporation, association, or other
organization organized in such a country, is
providing, directly or indirectly, a subsidy with
respect to the manufacture, production, or exportation
of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold
(or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United
States, and
(2) the Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United
States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of
that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the
likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for
importation, then there shall be imposed upon such
merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any
other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net
subsidy. For purposes of this subsection and section
1671d(b)(l) of this title, a reference to the sale of
merchandise includes the entering into of any leasing
arrangement regarding the merchandise that is
equivalent to the sale of the merchandise.
29 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1988).
30 Roses, Inc. v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 870 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
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C. The Law as Applied
1. Early Cases
The usual problem with interpreting the laws of countervailing duties
stems from the issue of what exactly qualifies as a "bounty or grant" or a
"subsidy."31 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to rule on this
question in 1903, just six years after the first version of section 1303 was
passed. 2 In Downs v. United States,33 the Department of the Treasury
levied a countervailing duty on an importer of Russian sugar. The Russian
government had levied taxes on sugar producers, but remitted those for sugar
that was exported. The Russians defended on the grounds that they were not
encouraging exports. They maintained that "the chief object of the
government is to prevent, or at least to discourage, over-production with its
attendant evils, and, to accomplish this, the law penalizes overproduction by
imposing thereon double the regular excise tax."' Thus, the remission was
not a bounty or grant; rather it was the failure to impose a penalty. Writing
for the majority, Justice Brown sought guidance from a higher authority than
himself: Webster's Dictionary. "A bounty," he wrote, "is defined by
Webster as 'a premium offered or given to induce men to enlist into the
public service; or to encourage any branch of industry, as husbandry or
manufactures."' 35 Perhaps more to the point, he also considered a report
issued from the Brussels Conference in 1898 convened for the purpose of
considering the question of sugar bounties. The report considered bounties
to be
31 Often, a defendant will also dispute the method used by the Department of
Commerce or the amount of the duty the Department imposed. Technicalities are not
within the scope of this paper, although they are touched upon from time to time.
32 This was § 5 of the Tariff Act of 1897. The two provisions are practically
identical, § 5 reading as follows:
[wjhenever any country, dependency, or colony shall pay or bestow...
any bounty or grant upon the exportation of any article or merchandise..
. there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, in addition to the duties
otherwise imposed by this act, an additional duty equal to the net amount
of such bounty or grant.
Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496, 501 (1903).
33 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
34 Id. at 503.
3- Id. at 501.
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[t]he direct advantages granted in case of exportation; the direct
advantages granted to production; the total or partial exemptions
from taxation granted to a portion of the manufactured products;
the indirect advantages growing out of surplus or allowance in
manufacturing effected beyond the legal estimates; and the profit
that may be derived from an excessive drawback.36
A bounty, therefore, is something that would, even if not directly
intended to promote exports, encourage others to enter the export market.
The Court held that a bounty existed because, under the Russian law, a
limited amount of sugar (called "free sugar") could be produced tax-free for
sale domestically.37 The tax for overproduction was sufficiently great that
"if [a producer] be near a seaport town, he will probably prefer to export his
surplus, even at the lower prices obtainable abroad."" Thus, despite the
law's intention to stabilize the domestic sugar market, an export incentive
existed that was sufficiently "bountiful" to justify countervailing duties to be
imposed.
Nicholas & Co. v. United States39 is another Supreme Court case
addressing the definition of "bounty or grant." This time, the Court was
interpreting paragraph E of section 4 of the Tariff Act of 1913, the successor
to the original countervailing duty law and one identical to current law.'
At issue was the "allowance of three pence and five pence per gallon made
... on exportation of certain British spirits."41 Again, the foreign exporters
argued that the purpose of the British act was not to encourage exports. The
allowances were "intended merely as compensation to distillers and rectifiers
for costs due to British excise regulations and are not confined to cases of
exportation."42 But the Court did not find it "necessary to go into such
confusing considerations." 43
The question in the case is more direct, and is whether the three
pence and five pence paid on account of export from the United
Kingdom is the bestowal, "directly or indirectly" of a "bounty or
grant upon the exportation of any article or merchandise from such
36 Id. at 501-02.
37 Id. at 515.
381 d. at 508.
39 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
0 This paper reflects case and statutory law through January 1, 1991.
4' Nicholas, 249 U.S. at 34.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 37.
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country," to use the words of [the statute]. Looking only at the
paragraph and judging from the first impressions of its words, the
problem presented would seem to be without difficulty. There is
paid to an exporter of spirits from the United Kingdom the sum of
three or five pence a gallon, as the case may be, and the instant
conclusion is that the sale of spirits to other countries is relieved
from a burden that their sale in the United Kingdom must bear.
There is a benefit, therefore, in exportation, an inducement to seek
the foreign market.'
The British further defended on the grounds that the term "bounty"
required some sort of accession to wealth, rather than the foregoing of some
detrimental tax. But the Court declined to consider the word bounty
separately from the word grant: "If the word 'bounty' has a limited sense the
word 'grant' has not. A word of broader significance than 'grant' could not
have been used."45
One general principle is derived from these two cases. It is the effect
of the bounty or grant on the product, rather than the intention of its
proponents, that controls. In both cases, the measure was to stabilize prices
or to otherwise manage some domestic issue. The result of the policies,
however, was seen in both decisions as an incentive to increase exports.
2. Statutory Changes in the Law
Both Downs and Nicholas involved subsidies that foreign
governments applied directly to a specific industry. The issue of what
constituted a "bounty or grant" became more complicated when two changes
in the countervailing duty law were enacted. First, section 1303 was enacted
with the words "upon the manufacture or production or export of any
article."' Section five of the Tariff Act of 1897, the act at issue in the
Downs case, was limited in application to subsidies granted "upon the
exportation of' an article of merchandise.47 Second, it was amended to add
a definition of the word subsidy.48
The first change broadened the scope of the rule by allowing
imposition of countervailing duties upon products whose "bounty" was
44Id.
45 Id. at 39.
46 Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified at 3 U.S.C. § 303 (1930); now
appearing as 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988)).
1 Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496, 501 (1903).
48 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1988).
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awarded any time prior to exportation, rather than limiting imposition to
products subsidized upon departing the country of origin. Eliminating "upon
exportation" allowed the U.S. to impose countervailing duties against
bounties whose application did not distinguish exported merchandise from
that sold domestically. Recall that the bounties in the Downs and Nicholas
cases involved government action that arose only when the products were
exported. Now, a grant or subsidy on any product that reached or could
reach U.S. shores could be countervailed, whether or not the grant was
specifically linked to exports.
The second change seemingly widened the coverage of the laws to
groups of industries, but actually became a limitation. Section 1677(5)(B) of
Title 19 attempted to clarify the law by listing some policies that would be
deemed subsidies "if provided or required by government action to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, whether publicly
or privately owned."49 Because duties could be imposed for policies that did
not distinguish exports, many programs seemed to be subsidies. A foreign
manufacturer's first line of defense, then, was to claim that they did not fall
within a definable industry or group.
3. Judicial Tests
Both Downs and Nicholas involved subsidies to a specific,
identifiable manufacturer or group of manufacturers. There remained the
question of the applicability of sections 1303 and 1671 to governmental
benefits that all manufacturers seemed to enjoy.
As indicated above, the ITA is charged with investigating allegations
of subsidization. The CIT will review the findings of the ITA and reverse
when the decision is unsubstantiated on the merits.' Whether a subsidy
available to everyone is countervailable is first a decision of the ITA. The
decision then remains to be litigated to determine its legality.
In the beginning, the ITA used the "general availability" test. The
test was explained and upheld in Carlisle ire and Rubber Co. v. United
States,5 a case involving an accelerated tax depreciation allowance for
machinery or equipment used directly for manufacturing. The allowance was
available to all taxpayers. The ITA's policy was that grants or subsidies
"available to all manufacturers [are] not preferential and are not bounties or
49 Id.
o See supra text accompanying notes 15-24.
s' 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
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grants."52 The Carlisle Tire and Rubber Company disagreed. They sought
imposition of countervailing duties on bicycle tires and tubes from the
Republic of Korea based on the benefits of the tax scheme mentioned above.
The ITA declined to impose countervailing duties because the subsidy did not
discriminate among producers. 3
The CIT agreed with the ITA for three reasons. First, since the ITA
was charged with administering the countervailing duty statute, the court was
willing to accord it "great deference."' Second, "absurd consequences
would flow" from the position that generally available benefits would be
countervailable. "Thus, included in . . . the category of countervailable
benefits would be such things as public highways and bridges, as well as a
tax credit for expenditures on capital investment even if available to all
industries and sectors."'55 Finally, these types of benefits simply did not fall
within "the proviso of section 1677(5)(B) that they be furnished 'to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries. '"56
The court in Carlisle Tire declined to countervail non-specific
governmental "bounties" mostly because they did not "seem"
countervailable. Common sense and logic dictated that "general" benefits
which everyone could enjoy were not the same export-assisting subsidies
contemplated by the countervailing duty statutes. Otherwise, virtually any
government policy benefitting a foreign manufacturer would fall within the
statute as long as U.S. manufacturers did not enjoy a corresponding benefit
of at least equal magnitude from their own government. Thus, an
administrative limitation on the law of countervailing duties became officially
sanctioned. Carlisle Tire lent to the law a judicial finding that, with respect
to subsidies having a "general availability," the imposition of a
countervailing duty would be plainly absurd.
There remained one development, however, that was to combine a
principle of the Downs and Nicholas cases with Carlisle Tire. Downs and
Nicholas stood for the idea that it is the effect, above all, that controls the
imposition of duties. Carlisle Tire held that generally available duties were
not countervailable. Could policies that were facially "generally available"
be, in reality, specific when applied, and if so, were these policies a
counterexception to the "general availability" rule?
-2 Id. at 837.
S3 Id. at 835-36.
AId. at 837.
5 Id. at 838-39.
56 Id. at 839 (emphasis by the court).
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Cabot Corp. v. United States7 severely limited the general
availability test by holding that subsidies that are generally available on their
face but which, in practice, are conferred on a select group are subject to
countervailing duties. In Cabot the plaintiff, a U.S. producer of carbon
black, sought review of an ITA determination that a Mexican program was
not a countervailable subsidy. Mexico provided government-set rates for
carbon black feedstock which, along with natural gas and water, is essential
for the production of carbon black.5" The policy was part of a
comprehensive development plan, available to everyone. Nonetheless,
ordinary folks were not lining up in Mexico to take advantage of "bargain
basement deals" on government-subsidized carbon black feedstock. There
were only two producers of carbon black, Hules Mexicanos and Negromex.
And because factories required specific tooling to make use of the type of
carbon black available, "no enterprises or industries in Mexico other than the
carbon black producers have the technology and ability to make commercial
use of the product."59 The court overruled the ITA determination that
government-set prices for carbon black feedstock were not countervailable
because they were available to any purchaser:
The distinction that has evaded the ITA is that not all so-called
generally available benefits are alike-some are benefits accruing
generally to all citizens, while others are benefits that when
actually conferred accrue to specific individuals or classes. Thus,
while it is true that a generalized benefit provided by government,
such as national defense, education or infrastructure, is not a
countervailable bounty or grant, a generally available benefit-one
that may be obtained by any and all enterprises or industries may
nevertheless accrue to specific recipients. General benefits are not
conferred upon any specific individuals or classes, while generally
available benefits, when actually bestowed, may constitute specific
grants conferred upon specific identifiable entities, which would be
subject to countervailing duties.'
5 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
s To help us better visualize the product in question, the court was kind enough
to provide the following: "Carbon black is elemental carbon with incidental or
planned surface oxidation that is formed under the controlled cracking, heating and
quenching of a petroleum derivative feedstock, commonly referred to as carbon black
feedstock." Id. at 727.
59 Id.
I Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
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"The appropriate standard," continued the court, "focuses on the de facto
case by case effect of benefits provided to recipients rather than on the
nominal availability of benefits." 61
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States' is an odd case that
completely rejected the general availability rule. This case found a generally
available benefit to be countervailable despite a finding of specifically-
accruing effects. Because it sits at odds with the other case law, it deserves
some mention here. Bethlehem Steel involved a South African tax law that
allowed 200 percent of training costs to be deductible as business expenses.
The court overruled an ITA determination that no bounty or grant existed.
Completely rejecting the notion that generally available benefits are exempt
from countervailing duties, the court asserted that "the entire productive
sector of a nation's economy is nothing more than a group of enterprises or
industries."' The court found the idea that a country could shield an
obvious subsidy merely by extending it to the entire economy to be an
"insurmountable absurdit[y]."'
Subsequent cases have not gone so far as to reject outright the notion
that a generally available benefit, enjoyed by all industries, is countervailable
under section 1303 or 1671. Courts relying on Bethlehem Steel cite it mainly
for its discussion of the interplay between the two code sections.' Other
courts cite it as an example of types of subsidies that are countervailable in
the first place.' Even courts that cite Bethlehem Steel to support some other
proposition implicitly reject its holding-not by criticizing the case, but by
merely ignoring it. In Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States,67 the
court cites Bethlehem Steel's language about the countervailability of tax laws
but adds at the same time that the laws "do not confer countervailable
benefits so long as, in their actual operation, they do not "result in special
bestowals upon specific enterprises."68 This language is more closely
61 Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
62 590 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
63 Id. at 1242.
4 Id.
65 See PPG Indus. v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 258, 264 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987); Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 730, 732 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985).
6 See Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1206, 1212
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (noting that tax laws are countervailable according to Bethlehem
Steel).
' 661 F. Supp. 1206 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
68 Id. at 1212.
1024 [Vol. 52:1011
BOUNTY HUNTING IN OUR TIME
aligned with the thinking in Cabot: generally available benefits are not
countervailable if they do not have specific effects.
It is unclear how much weight courts will give to the "general
availability" factor. But general availability, even if no longer a bright line
test, is not dead. Indeed, consider the following from PPG Industries v.
United States.' This case revives the test altogether:
We do not consider a domestic program that does not restrict
participation to specific industries or locations and that in fact is
used by a wide variety of industries in various locations to be
specifically provided. Therefore, we continue to uphold our
determination that the [program under contention] is not provided
to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries, and that the program is not countervailable. 7
4. Subsidies Generally Considered Countervailable
Given general principles laid down by the Supreme Court, a statutory
scheme, and the scheme's judicial construction, rough categories of subsidies
have been identified as generally countervailable. 71 In one category are
found direct subsidy payments like those from Nicholas. Despite attempts to
characterize the allowance as compensation for additional costs, the Supreme
Court held them to be subsidies.' Downs illustrates another category: tax
schemes.' These include tax rebates, preferential tax treatments, including
accelerated depreciation allowances, and unjustified tax remissions, especially
those linked to export sales. Government price support programs are a third
category; another is loss indemnification for exports with associated credit-
risk guarantees. Currency manipulation schemes can provide favorable
exchange rates to certain producers and exporters.7' Transport subsidies or
preferential supplies of goods and services are more means to subsidize
production.75
69 712 F. Supp. 195 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
70 Id. at 200.
71 J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING Am ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW, THE
EUROPEAN CoMMuNIT1Es 127-36 (1986); Fuller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An
Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the
Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 17 (1969).
72J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at 129.
73 Id. at 132-35.
74 Id. at 130.
75 Id. at 130-32.
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D. Summary
The law applying to countervailing duties can be summarized as
follows: Two sections of the United States Code provide the substantive law;
they apply to different countries (one section is for signatories of the GATT
Subsidies Code) but are interpreted the same way. These statutes provide that
bounties, grants, or subsidies that are generally available to all manufacturers
are not subject to countervailing duties, but those subsidies accruing to
specific industries or groups of industries are subject to them. The purpose
of the bounty or grant counts for nothing. Although the fact that it is
(facially) available to everyone in the exporting country could give rise to a
presumption of general availability, a benefit that is generally available could
in fact accrue primarily to specific industries.
Ill. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
This section discusses the specific application of countervailing duty
law to regional development programs. It further explores regional
development programs, reviews case law applying countervailing duty laws
to subsidies arising under a regional development program, and offers an
evaluation of these cases.
A. Regional Development Programs: Nature and Purpose
Economies develop naturally by regions. One author explained that
industries first located either in areas where production was largely
"artisanal" (such as textiles), and then mechanized using new forms of
energy, or in areas which possessed natural resources (particularly iron and
coal), which corresponded to new activities in steel-producing technology and
metallurgy.76 The rise in technology, the geographic location of natural
resources used in producing primary products, and competition limited
71 J. PERRIN, LE DtVELOPPEMENT RIGioNAL 42 (1974). I regret that this book is
not published in English, and I will reproduce paraphrased material in the original,
here:
Les premieres industries se localisent soit dans des zones ob existaient
d~ji. des activit6s de production (par exemple textile) jusque-lh artisanales
et qui se mdcanisent en utilisant des formes nouvelles d'6nergie, soit dans
des zones qui poss.dent les ressources naturelles, sp6cialement le fer et le
charbon, correspondant aux activit6s nouvelles de la sid6rurgie et de la
m~tallurgie.
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largely to the area all favored the creation of regional economies. New
technology gives rise to second-generation products that use additional raw
materials. Thus progresses development in these areas. The United States is
informally divided into industrial regions, many agricultural, through terms
such as "Iron Belt," "Corn Belt," and "Sun Belt."
Economic development is not, however, guaranteed-or guaranteed
to last forever. Some geographic areas either never develop or never sustain
a high level of economic activity. Regions also decline. Their resources are
depleted, their equipment becomes obsolete, and interregional competition
develops, brought on by better technology, better transportation, and better
communication.' Regions in decline become depressed, both economically
and psychologically, through unemployment and crumbling infrastructures.
Those areas that have managed to sustain their growth often do so through
policies which keep them competitive and forestall decline.
Countries, therefore, undertake to develop specific geographic
regions. In the summer of 1990, China announced a regional development
program in light technology. The British Broadcasting Company reported that
"[t]he more developed coastal area in east China will concentrate on
technology-intensive sectors. The area will, on the one hand, continue to
improve its investment climate and expand market abroad for its products,
and on the other help the middle and western areas develop their pillar
industries.""8 In Brazil, President Fernando Collor de Mello has used
regional development programs to redistribute wealth geographically in light
of monumental poverty in the northeast.79 The Philippines, Thailand,
Malaysia, Nepal, and many other Asian countries have turned to regional
development schemes as a way to benefit the country as a whole." The
United States' experience is limited largely to mostly federal "urban
77
Ddsormais, les rdgions qui ont ddcolld et qui voulent continuer A
progresser doivent s'affronchier des alias lids A la possession de ressources
naturelles .... [Lia concurrence interrdgionale est rendue de plus en plus
aiguE par les progres des transports A grande distance. On notera aussi que
les rdgions les plus anciennement ddvelopdes doivent faire face au
vieillissement relatif et h l'absolescence de leurs dquipements.
PERRIN, supra note 76, at 56-57.
78 Industrial Production; Light Industry to Undergo Adjustments, BBC, Summary
of World Broadcasts, August 29, 1990 at FE/W0143/A/1.
79 A "Have" Country Full of Have-Nots, L.A. Times, August 23, 1990, at B7,
col. 2.
s See UNCRO (UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT),
GROWrH POLE STRATEGY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN ASIA (1975).
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renewal" programs. The limitation stems partly from the fact that power is
shared at so many levels (city, county, state, federal) that a coherent policy
to reduce "pockets of poverty," such as Appalachia, is difficult to organize.
Blame lies also in a "general anti-planning" mentality that one French writer
deems to be present in the United States.81
B. Regional Development Policies in Countervailing Duty Cases
It is well-settled that regional development programs are subject to
scrutiny under U.S. law for purposes of imposing countervailing duties. The
benefits of the programs can be reviewed to determine whether they
constitute a bounty or grant. In almost all cases, regional assistance has
satisfied the statutory criteria for imposition of a countervailing duty.
Subsidies bestowed upon specific regions for purposes of helping
manufacturers seemed so obviously "bounties" that they have been routinely
countervailed.
Before Carlisle Tire's rule that generally available subsidies were
exempt, foreign governments tried to argue that a subsidy that merely offset
the disadvantages of being in a depressed region was not really a subsidy.
This argument has been successful. Although courts are quick to decide that
a subsidy exists, they offer to calculate the "net" subsidy. In ASG Industries
v. United States,' a regional program conferring a "net" subsidy was
sufficient to require imposition of a countervailing duty.
ASG Industries involved domestic manufacturers and wholesalers of
float glass. They alleged that benefits under various regional development
programs that included low-interest loans and investment subsidies in the
form of cash grants and tax credits were bounties or grants within the
countervailing duty law. "Once it has been determined that a bounty or grant
is being paid or bestowed," wrote the court,
19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) provides that "there shall be levied... a
duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant." Such
language implies that certain deductions may be made from the
actual payments to calculate the net bounty or grant and that all
relevant circumstances are to be taken into account.'
S PERRIN, supra note 76, at 172. "La situation actuelle aux Etats-Unis [est Ie
produit d'] un vieux r~flexe g~n~ral antiplan ficateur."
82 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
83 Id. at 777.
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In a corresponding footnote, the court noted that "Congress reiterated this
'net amount' concept in the legislative history of the extension of the waiver
provision."" Further quoting Congress, the court observed: "The
countervailing duty, which is imposed in addition to regular duties, is equal
to the net amount of the bounty or grant and is intended to offset the
advantage afforded by the foreign subsidy practice."85 The court also found
support in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 6 in which the Supreme
Court considered remission of an excise tax as an offset to the bounty
received.87 Finally, the court took language from the 1897 statute itself,
which did provide for levying of duties equal to the "net amount" of any
export bounty or grant. 81 Thus, the court concluded,
[o]nce it is established that a foreign manufacturer is receiving
payments such as those here involved... from its government, a
countervailing duty must, absent a waiver by the Secretary, be
imposed unless, in considering all circumstances surrounding the
payment, certain deductions can be established resulting in no net
benefit to that manufacturer.9
Michelin ire Corp. v. United States' extensively considered offsets
in determining the amount of a subsidy. The court seemed to give the
defendant every break. It "removed from the equation those benefits of the
location [that] cannot be quantified," 9' such as the absence of a separatist
movement troubling neighboring Qu6bec. Further, the court declined to limit
the offsets to specific categories of grants or bounties:
Although these regional development programs may channel their
aid into specific categories such as construction, it is abundantly
clear that they are intended to compensate for a wide range of
disadvantages of the region. A distinction must be recognized
between the variety of problems which these programs are intended
to alleviate over a prolonged period of time and the necessity of
embodying the aid in a form which can be of practical use to a
141 d. at n. 14.
5 d. (citing S. RFP. No. 45, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979)).
86 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
87ASG Indus. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770, 778 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
88 Id. at 777.
Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
'0 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143 (1981).
9' Id. at 160.
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recipient. If offsets are to be considered, a fair evaluation must
take into account the full range of disadvantages of the region and
not limit itself to the nominal category of the grant.92
And so, over several pages, the court manipulated various mathematical
formulae and considered both sides' arguments about what should be
included and how to calculate the amounts. Ultimately, considering the
weight of all the evidence, the court sustained the original determination of
the net subsidy.
In Carlisle Tire the court noted in dictum that "although no decision
of this court has directly passed on this specific question, several cases
suggest that at a minimum either a regional or industry preference be present
in order for a bounty or grant to exist."' The court was rather loose in its
observation; the case did not involve a regional development program at all.
The observation became law: In United States Steel Corp. v. United
States" (decided three weeks after Carlisle Tire by the same judge as in
Michelin Tire) the court flatly states that "the countervailing duty law
operates in cases where a special advantage or preferential treatment is given
to a class of persons. Availability of special treatment to an entire industry
or region is still the grant of an advantage or preference under the law."'95
By 1985 it was taken for granted that, despite the
noncountervailability of generally available subsidies, regional ones were
countervailable. In Hercules, Inc. v. United States,96 the court flatly stated:
"It is clear from the case law, the term 'subsidy' has been interpreted to
include regional preference programs as countervailable subsidies."97 The
court cited United States Steel and relied on the same line of cases.9" The
court also cited the observation by the Carlisle Tire court to support its
assertion. 99
It seems that the law has developed as follows: The early cases
involving regional development programs were decided before Carlisle Tire.
The Carlisle Tire case established the notion that programs available to an
2 Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
9 Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 838 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983).
9' 566 F. Supp. 1529 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
95 Id. at 1537.
96 673 F. Supp. 454 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
97Id. at 476.
98 Id.
99Id.
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entire country generally were not countervailable. No court addressed the
possibility that regional development programs could be considered
"generally available" to the region, rather than to the country as a whole. In
considering the entire country, regional programs would, by definition, not
fall into the category of "generally available" and could be presumed, at the
outset, not to qualify for the exemption.
Following Cabot Corp. v. United States,"°° subsidies "generally
available" were not automatically exempt; a case-by-case approach was
required to determine whether any specific effects were accruing. Comeau
Seafoods Ltd. v. United States,1"' decided in mid-1989, considered a
Canadian program benefitting provinces differently depending on their
economic disadvantage (per capita income, level of unemployment, and
capacity to raise revenue). In fact, the program was available to industries
all over Canada (in different amounts, of course, depending on region) and
the criteria were neutrally applied. Because the regional programs did accrue
to specific recipients (i.e., the poor ones), the program was
countervailable. 1 "
C. Special Treatment for Regional Development Programs?
Whether countervailing duty rules apply to regional development
programs depends on the tests and rules of construction that the courts apply
to subsidy cases in general. Whether countervailing duty rules should apply
to regional development programs requires a closer look at the programs
themselves and at the spirit of U.S. law. If regional development programs
number among the practices that U.S. customs laws were intended to
address, the application of the law to these programs should not be
challenged. The following section looks at both the programs and laws to
evaluate the imposition of countervailing duties.
1. The Spirit of the Law
Consider the following remarks: "The purpose of the [countervailing
duty] law is to prevent unequal competition in our markets-to prevent
foreign goods from competing with domestic goods at a lower price than they
would be sold." 1" "This purpose is relatively clear from the face of the
ico 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
o 724 F. Supp. 1407 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
1021d. at 1416.
03 ASG Indus. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1230 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1979).
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statute and is confirmed by the congressional debates: the countervailing duty
was intended to offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers
would enjoy from export subsidies paid by their governments."' These
writers suggest that receipt of assistance from a foreign government corrupts
the free market system. Does all government aid so corrupt? If all benefits
are bounties or grants, would not things such as highways and bridges, as
well as tax credits for capital expenditure be countervailable?
The statutes that provide for countervailing duties are worded to
apply to all bounties and grants and subsidies. Because this application is too
broad, judges have devised tests to determine when the statute should apply.
The current state of the law-that generally available benefits except those
that, in effect, turn out not to accrue to specific industries-reflects an
intelligent, workable policy. Under these rules, some governmental programs
are countervailable; some are not. When rules and judicial tests weed out the
government programs that the law was never intended to address, the law
will work perfectly.
The law does not work well in the case of regional development
programs. Under the rules, regional development programs are routinely
countervailed, yet they do not seem to fall within the purpose of the statute.
There is no indication, either in the legislative history or in the subsequent
case law, that "group of industries" was ever intended to refer to industries
grouped geographically, rather than by product. This determination seems to
have come about in an attempt to find a justification for excluding regional
development programs from the "general availability" exception without
having to limit the inquiry to the region.
Furthermore, regional development programs would be exempt from
countervailing duties if considered within the context of the region and not
the entire country. Why, for example, should a program in Nova Scotia be
considered special merely because it is not available in British Columbia, a
continent away? These areas are not separate countries, and if they were,
depressed Nova Scotia might find many of its regional policies sufficiently
"generally available" to exempt them from U.S. customs law.
2. Traditional Government Benefits
Some government activities cannot be efficiently managed by the
private sector. Thus, no case has held that bridges, roads, and other similar
104 British Steel Corp. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 286 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985)
(citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-56).
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benefits are countervailable subsidies. Perhaps it is because everyone knows
that governments are supposed to provide these services to constituents.
Regional development is a process that free enterprise cannot be
expected to undertake. It also is a process that requires government
intervention. 5 As one writer pointed out,
[i]t is fitting... that interregional imbalances should be managed.
Spatial inequalities cannot be corrected by market forces. On the
contrary, the market, if left to its own devices, serves to amplify
them. Here still, the threshold is quickly passed beyond which
imbalances cease to have beneficial effects for becoming
cumulative and become an impede any developing impetus for
lagging regions. Kept dependent on growth regions, they have that
much more difficulty in achieving autonomy in development." 6
A rule exempting true regional development programs-those without
industry preferences in their operation-from countervailing duties would be
consistent with the GATT, of which the U.S. is a member. Article III
explicitly permits "the payments of subsidies exclusively to domestic
producers," although direct subsidies for exports of non-primary products
were to end after 1958.17 Article XI of the Agreement attempts to clarify
the GATT position on the definition of subsidy. It states that
[s]ignatories recognize that subsidies other than export subsidies
are widely used as important instruments for the promotion of
social and economic policy objectives and do not intend to restrict
the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and
other important policy objectives which they consider desirable.
Signatories note that among such objectives are the elimination of
105 See PERRIN, supra note 76, at 71-110.
106
I1 convient... de maltriser les ddsdquilibres interrdgionaux. Or les
indgalit6s spatiales ne peuvent pas 6tre corrig6es par les m6canismes du
march6. Au contraire, celui-ci contribue, si on le laisse jouer librement, h
les amplifier. Iei encore le seuil est vite d6pass6 au-delh duquel les
ddsdquilibres cessent d'avoir des effets b6n~fiques pour devenir cumulatifs
et constituer un obstacle h l'essor des rdgions en retard. Maintenues dans
la ddpendance des rgions foyers, elles on d'autant plus de mal A
conquerir leur autonomic de dgveloppement.
Id. at 109.
107 BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 236.
1991] 1033
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
industrial, economic, and social disadvantages of specific
regions. '
The European Economic Community (EEC) takes a similar approach.
In the EEC, "domestic subsidies, for example in the form of governmental
aid to depressed areas, were a legitimate exercise of national power which
ought not to be countervailed unless the subvention in question was a
disguised form of export subsidy." 1"
3. A Proposed Approach
The abandonment of the "general availability" test was not a
mistake-outside the context of regional development programs. It makes
sense to go beyond a facial review of a foreign program; if the benefits of
the program are truly accruing to one industry, then the program does fall
within those contemplated by the countervailing duty rules. I do not suggest
that regional development programs receive lesser scrutiny. If, under a
regional development program, benefits accrue to a specific industry or
group, then the program might also deserve countervailability. However, a
better approach is a balancing test that considers more than just who benefits
and by how much. Courts should consider a number of factors.
First, is the program one that a government, exclusively, has the
power to implement? Markets are distorted when governments act
inconsistently with standards of commercial reasonableness in areas usually
left to businesses. In some projects, however, private enterprise is not the
best vehicle. A regional development is one of those projects.
Second, it is important to consider the purpose of the government
program. Many programs will involve loans, grants, and other incentives that
fall outside traditional governmental benefits, yet regional development
requires them in order to spur growth and development of industry. Our laws
must distinguish between government programs designed to benefit a specific
sector and programs designed to implement broader goals, such as a lower
inflation rate or improved health care.1 '
108 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, Part II, art. 11, 31
U.S.T. 513, T.A.I.S. No. 9619.
109 J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at 15.
110 This is precisely the language the Department of Commerce used to justify its
refusal to countervail programs it considered "generally available." Panzerella, Is the
Specificity Test Generally Applicable?, 18 LAw & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 147, 422
n.22.
1034 [Vol. 52:1011
BOUNTY HUNTING IN OUR TIME
Third, our laws should consider other indications of the good faith
of the program. Some programs may look like bona fide governmental
development when they are really underhanded attempts to manipulate their
export position. Likewise, some programs may seem to accrue to a specific
recipient, but perhaps this phenomena will disappear when other beneficiaries
grow sufficiently to take advantage of the program.
Thus, courts should consider whether the program seems arbitrary
or capricious. This standard of review, the same as applied to administrative
agencies,111 would test the good faith of the foreign government in
providing the grant. The court should consider the actual benefits accrued,
and the extent to which the program seems likely to produce the stated goals.
Admittedly, this approach seems to meddle in the policy-making apparatus
of foreign governments, but it is no more intrusive than the current
system-where interrogatories and explanations are demanded of foreign
governments. Perhaps other countries may even be more willing to cooperate
if they see the United States as a reasonable actor, willing to allow
governments to operate in spite of a justifiable concern over unfair trade.
A rule that takes into consideration the real intent of the policy and
balances its reasonableness against its disruptive effect on international trade
would prevent other, perhaps more bizarre, results under current law. For
example, Senator Steve Symms (R-Idaho) is worried about "subsidies coming
through environmental laws." 1 According to him, a fertilizer plant in
Saskatchewan threatens his "constituents in direct competition with the
Canadian fertilizer interests" 3 because the environmental laws in that
province are less restrictive than those in Idaho. Can failure to enact an
environmental standard as exacting as that in the U.S. be considered a bounty
or grant?
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper summarized the laws relating to countervailing duties. It
looked in particular at the law as it affects regional development programs,
and provided some comment about this area of the law. Countervailing duties
are now enforced on a case-by-case basis; those having particular effects on
a specific industry or group of industries are countervailable despite being
generally available on their face.
" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
12 Transcript of International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance
Committee, September 28, 1990, remarks of Senator Steve Symms.
113 Id.
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This law makes sense, generally, but an exception is warranted for
regional development programs. Currently, regional development programs
are countervailable because a region is a "group of industries" under the law.
These industries receive a preference over those in the country as a whole.
This makes it exceedingly difficult for countries, especially Canada, to
develop regions and continue to maintain a civil trading relationship with the
very important U.S. market. A better approach is a balancing test to consider
the nature of the program, its purpose, and its good faith. Such an approach
would not frustrate legitimate programs by governments. Additionally, such
an approach would extend the rule of "general availability"-a rule which
makes sense in cases of general development programs-to specific regions,
and would consider the particular region as the economic unit to which
subsidies are bestowed.
Under the basic economic theory of comparative advantage, market
players who, under assumed ideal conditions, specialize their talents and
trade with players who specialize in some other field, produce together a
rational market in which everybody gains. Allocating resources to those
industries in which a country does not have a comparative advantage is
inefficient. Allocating resources to areas of a country that have comparatively
less to offer than other areas is also inefficient. But governments sometimes
have to make inefficient allocations. Welfare payments, for example,
arguably are inefficient since they allocate resources from those who produce
to those who, for whatever reason, find themselves producing less than they
need to live. A blind notion that all government intervention is bad because
it is inefficient is wrong.
On the whole, a true regional development keeps people alive. It
encourages productivity and self-sufficiency. Regional development should
not be discouraged. A clear, fair approach to countervailing duties in
regional development cases would forestall foreign wrath as evidenced in
Canada's elections, a wrath that undermines the very trading position that the
countervailing duty law was implemented to protect.
D. Ronald Surbey
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